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CHANGING FACES: MORPHED CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
IMAGES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Stacey Steinberg*
ABSTRACT
Technology has changed the face of child pornography. The Supreme Court
has held that child pornography harms a child both in the creation of the image
and the circulation of the image, and thus has ruled that the possession and
distribution of child pornography falls outside the realm of First Amendment
protections. However, today’s images depicting child pornography do not
always depict an actual child engaged in a pornographic act. Instead, some
images depicting child pornography are “morphed images.”
Morphed child pornography is created when the innocent image of a child
is combined with a separate, sexually explicit image, usually of an adult. The
children depicted in these images are not harmed in the creation of the image,
as they were not photographed while engaging in a sexual or obscene act.
Nevertheless, the circulation of these images harms children. The distribution,
or potential distribution, is damaging to the depicted child’s emotional wellbeing and reputation. Furthermore, these morphed images could cause
additional harm to other children, as pedophiles use child pornography to
groom future victims.
In response to the changing face of child pornography and the harms
associated with it, Congress enacted the PROTECT Act, which bans morphed
images like the ones described above. Despite this effort to protect children’s
images online, there remains much to be done. First, the Supreme Court must
uphold the PROTECT Act, finding that morphed child pornography is outside
the scope of the First Amendment. Second, to respond to the harms morphed
child pornography causes, states must amend their statutory definitions of child
pornography. Lastly, parents must be cognizant of the risk associated with
oversharing pictures as these images can be stolen and then used for illicit
purposes. This proposal balances a defendant’s First Amendment right to free
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INTRODUCTION
As technology evolves, so too does the face of child pornography. Child
pornography traditionally depicted actual child sexual abuse. These images fall
outside the protection of the First Amendment and their possession and
distribution constitutes a criminal offense under federal and state laws.1 With the
advent of computer morphing software, today’s child pornography images
sometimes do not depict actual abuse.2 Some of these images are virtual and do
not involve images of actual children at all.3 Despite Congress’s attempt to
criminalize all obscene images depicting children, the Supreme Court has held
that possession and distribution of images that look like, but are not actually
children is protected speech under the First Amendment.4
Morphed child pornography falls between traditional child pornography and
virtual child pornography. These images involve actual children; however, the
full image often combines an “innocent” image of a child with a sexual or nude
image of an adult.5 Through morphing, pedophiles create and often share these
pornographic images.6 To protect children from this computer technology,
Congress enacted the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act).7 This Act
prohibits all obscene images that depict children, regardless of whether a child
was abused in the image’s creation.8
The creation and distribution of morphed images is becoming increasingly
common. Often, the innocent child image component of morphed images
originates on social media and blogs.9 Parents often share their children’s

1
See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding child pornography is not in the
realm of First Amendment protection).
2
See, e.g., United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 727 (2d Cir. 2011) (describing how one defendant
created morphed images).
3
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002).
4
Id. at 258.
5
Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 730.
6
Id.
7
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 34
U.S.C.).
8
4 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW § 40.01[2] (2017) (“Unlike computer-created
images or depictions of adults altered to appear to be child pornography, at least one court has held that a
morphed depiction of actual children (in this case, an identifiable child’s face superimposed on the body of a
young naked boy in a suggestive pose) was not protected by the First Amendment and could serve as the basis
for a child pornography possession conviction under the CPPA.”) (citing United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 901 (2005)).
9
Sharon Kirkey, Do You Know Where Your Child’s Image Is? Pedophiles Sharing Photos from Parents’
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pictures in a variety of ways, and images that may not appear prurient to the
average viewer might elicit an unexpected and inappropriate response if viewed
by a pedophile or someone with pedophiliac interests.10 Unbeknownst to
parents, viewers can save their children’s images and later use them to create
morphed child pornography.11 While there is limited data reflecting how
common this practice is, Canadian law enforcement officers report that this
practice is worrisome to their department.12 Moreover, the Australian Children’s
eSafety Commissioner reported that about 50% of all images on one pedophile
image-sharing site with at least forty-five million images originated on social
media and family blogs.13
While the children depicted in morphed images are usually not harmed in
the image’s creation,14 these children can potentially suffer significant harm
once a morphed image is circulated. To protect children from the harm of
circulation, courts should hold that shared morphed images depicting child
pornography fall outside the protection of the First Amendment.
Part I of this Article will explore the historical underpinnings of First
Amendment jurisprudence as it pertains to actual child pornography from its
inception as a criminal offense, to the morphed images depicting child
pornography of today. Part II of this Article will discuss the harms morphed
images cause. It will also explore the harm that circulation of other private
material that is sexual in nature causes and discuss how this harm has been
balanced against a defendant’s right to free speech. This nuanced approach
allows us to better understand how courts might balance the harm that circulation
of a morphed image causes with the First Amendment. Lastly, Part III of this
Article lays out a cogent path forward. It proposes a workable solution that
balances a defendant’s First Amendment right to free speech against the harm
that circulation of morphed images causes.

Social Media Accounts, NAT’L POST (Apr. 18, 2017, 6:16 PM), http://nationalpost.com/news/canada/photosshared-on-pedophile-sites-taken-from-parents-social-media-accounts.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Lucy Battersby, Millions of Social Media Photos Found on Child Exploitation Sharing Sites, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Sept. 30, 2015, 12:23 PM), http://www.smh.com.au/national/millions-of-social-mediaphotos-found-on-child-exploitation-sharing-sites-20150929-gjxe55.html.
14
Kirkey, supra note 9 (“Pictures of children doing perfectly normal things—a snapshot of a child at a
gymnastics performance, a toddler playing with a Tonka truck—have been stolen and implanted on child sexual
abuse imagery sites, pedophile photo-sharing galleries and highly sexualized ‘child modeling’ websites, says the
head of Canada’s national tip line for online child pornography.”).
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CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In most cases involving child pornography before the mid-1990s, the
distinction between harm in pornography’s creation and harm in pornography’s
circulation was of little to no consequence.15 This is because computer
technology had not advanced enough for an image of child pornography to exist
that did not originate with the actual occurrence of a criminal act.16 Indeed, child
pornography before the 1990s captured the abuse of the child in the
pornographic image.17 Without the advance of computer technology, there could
be no child pornography created without harming and abusing an actual child.
A. Child Pornography Jurisprudence from Inception to the Advent of
Computer Morphing Technology
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the child pornography exception
to the First Amendment in the case of New York v. Ferber.18 In that case, a
bookstore sold two videos of young boys masturbating to an undercover police
officer.19 The state charged the defendant under its state statute criminalizing
child pornography.20 The statute reads, in relevant part, “[a] person is guilty of
promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character and
content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which
includes sexual conduct by a child less than seventeen years of age.”21 The
defendant challenged the conviction on First Amendment grounds.22 However,
the Court disagreed, holding that distribution of child pornography, as defined
in the New York state statute, fell outside the protection of the First
Amendment.23 The Court explained that under a strict scrutiny test, the state had

15
See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760–61 (1982) (examining the issues surrounding the
First Amendment and actual child pornography).
16
S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 2 (1996).
17
See DANIEL S. CAMPAGNA & DONALD L. POFFENBERGER, THE SEXUAL TRAFFICKING IN CHILDREN
118 (1988).
18
458 U.S. 747.
19
Id. at 752.
20
Id.
21
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 2017).
22
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760–61 (“Respondent does not contend that the State is unjustified in pursuing
those who distribute child pornography. Rather, he argues that it is enough for the State to prohibit the
distribution of materials that are legally obscene under the Miller test. While some States may find that this
approach properly accommodates its interests, it does not follow that the First Amendment prohibits a State from
going further. The Miller standard, like all general definitions of what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect
the State’s particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of
children.”).
23
Id. at 757–58.
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an interest in protecting children from the harm these images cause and that this
interest outweighed the defendant’s right to free speech.24
In its opinion, the Court discussed the specific harms child pornography
causes.25 First, the Court recognized that “the use of children as subjects of
pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental
health of the child.”26 Second, the Court noted that the images created a
“permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is
exacerbated by their circulation.”27 Third, the Court held that “[t]he advertising
and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for, and are thus
an integral part of the production of such materials.”28 Fourth, the Court
addressed the societal value of the images at issue, holding that any value, if
there was any at all, was de minimis.29 Lastly, the Court noted that its decision,
holding child pornography outside the protections of the First Amendment, was
consistent with the Court’s earlier decisions.30
The Court expanded the child pornography exception to the First
Amendment in 1990.31 In Osborne v. Ohio,32 a defendant was convicted of
possessing images of nude adolescent boys in “sexually explicit position[s].”33
Unlike Ferber, where the defendant was convicted for distributing pornographic
images,34 the defendant in Osborne was viewing images in his own home.35 The

24
Id. at 757 (“Accordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional
well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights.
In Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, the Court held that a statute prohibiting use of a child to distribute literature
on the street was valid notwithstanding the statute’s effect on a First Amendment activity. In Ginsberg v. New
York, supra, we sustained a New York law protecting children from exposure to nonobscene literature. Most
recently, we held that the Government’s interest in the ‘well-being of its youth’ justified special treatment of
indecent broadcasting received by adults as well as children.”) (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978)).
25
Id. at 758 & n.9.
26
Id. at 758.
27
Id. at 759.
28
Id. at 761.
29
Id. at 762.
30
Id. at 763–64 (“Recognizing and classifying child pornography as a category of material outside the
protection of the First Amendment is not incompatible with our earlier decisions. ‘The question whether speech
is, or is not, protected by the First Amendment often depends on the content of the speech.’ . . . When a definable
class of material, such as that covered by § 263.15, bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children
engaged in its production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is permissible
to consider these materials as without the protection of the First Amendment.”).
31
See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 107.
34
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751–52.
35
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 107.
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case suggests that the defendant did not create the images, nor did he offer the
images for sale to a third party.36 The Court relied on the earlier Ferber decision,
noting that the state has a strong interest in protecting “the physiological,
emotional, and mental health” of children.37 Along with this harm, the Court
held that “[i]t is also surely reasonable for the State to conclude that it will
decrease the production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess
and view the product, thereby decreasing demand.”38 The Osborne Court
identified additional grounds for upholding the conviction, many rooted in the
Ferber decision.39 It rested part of its holding on the harm caused by the
circulation of the image, noting that “[t]he pornography’s continued existence
causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to
come.”40 Lastly, the Osborne Court identified a new ground for excluding child
pornography from the protection of the First Amendment, recognizing that
pedophiles use pornographic images “to seduce other children into sexual
activity.”41

B. Addressing the Changing Face of Child Pornography: Congress’s
Failed Attempt to Ban Virtual Child Pornography
Shortly after the Osborne decision, those seeking to end the creation,
distribution, and possession of child pornography faced a new challenge.42
Technology was advancing, and pedophiles were finding new ways to create
images depicting the sexual abuse of children.43 Considering these
advancements, Congress set out to address the changing face of child
pornography.44 It did so through the enactment of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA).45

36

See id. at 106–07.
Id. at 109 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756–58).
38
Id. at 109–10.
39
See id. at 109–15 (noting, for example, that a permanent record is made of the child’s abuse).
40
Id. at 111.
41
Id.
42
See generally Sarah Sternberg, Note, The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 and the First
Amendment: Virtual Antitheses, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2783 (2001) (discussing the new challenge courts are
dealing with in deciding how to handle morphed images).
43
Id. at 2783 (“Soon it will not be necessary to actually molest children to produce child pornography
. . . . All that will be necessary will be an inexpensive computer, readily available software, and a photograph of
a neighbor’s child shot while the child walked to school or waited for the bus.”) (quoting The Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1237 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (prepared
testimony of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice)).
44
See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2012).
45
18 U.S.C. § 2252A.
37
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Through the enactment of the CPPA, Congress attempted to broaden the
definition of child pornography.46 While federal law previously designated only
actual images of children engaged in pornographic acts as constituting the
criminal offense of child pornography, the CPPA expanded on the definition of
child pornography to include “any visual depiction, including any photograph,
film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture” that
is, or appears to be, of “a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct”47 and any
sexually explicit image that is “advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression” it depicts “a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”48
Congress had good reason to be concerned about the new “virtual images”
flooding the Internet. Child pornography does not only harm the children
depicted in an image, but it also creates material for child abusers to use when
grooming future victims of sexual abuse.49
“Peer pressure” in the form of visual depictions plays a crucial role in
“the ‘cycle’ of child pornography.” That cycle consists of seven stages,
namely (1) showing child pornography to a child for “educational
purposes,” (2) attempting to persuade the child that sexual activity is
permitted and even pleasurable, (3) convincing the child that because
his peers engage in sexual activity such activity is acceptable,
(4) “desensitiz[ing] the child, [and] lowering the child’s inhibitions[,]”
(5) engaging the child in sexual activity, (6) photographing such
sexual activity, and (7) using the resulting child pornography to
“attract and seduce yet more child victims.”50

Congress also noted that pedophiles often use child pornography “to
stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites.”51 These significant concerns,
Congress noted, are not diminished simply because an image is virtual.52 While
no child is harmed in the creation of such an image, Congress was concerned

46
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8); see also Sternberg, supra note 42, at 2796–98 (discussing the legislative history
of the CPPA).
47
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B).
48
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000).
49
Sternberg, supra note 42, at 2786 (“Child molesters may use child pornography as ‘instructional aids,’
teaching children about the behavior that is expected of them and demonstrating to them that engaging in such
acts is normal.”).
50
Id. (citing CAMPAGNA & POFFENBERGER, supra note 17) (citations omitted).
51
S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 2 (1996) (finding that “child pornography is often used by pedophiles and
child sexual abusers to stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites, and as a model for sexual acting out with
children; such use of child pornography can desensitize the viewer to the pathology of sexual abuse or
exploitation of children, so that it can become acceptable to and even preferred by the viewer”).
52
See id.
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that children might be harmed in the future as a result of the image’s
circulation.53
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,54 the Free Speech Coalition challenged
the CPPA arguing that this concern about future harm was an unconstitutional
basis for outlawing child pornography.55 This pivotal case highlighted the
difficulty legislatures faced in enacting laws that both protect children from
sexual abuse and at the same time protect defendants’ rights to free speech.56
Under the CPPA, images that did not depict actual children were still considered
child pornography.57 The CPPA outlawed images of youthful looking adults that
were posed to look like children and even some cartoon images depicting
children engaged in sexual acts.58 The Free Speech Coalition contended that
since many of the images banned under the CPPA did not depict actual children,
the CPPA was not narrowly tailored enough to withstand First Amendment
challenges.59
Congress found that the images the CPPA criminalized harmed children in
significant ways.60 “In its legislative findings, Congress recognized that there
are subcultures of persons who harbor illicit desires for children and commit
criminal acts to gratify the impulses.”61 Furthermore, the Court noted that
Congress, when enacting the CPPA, “found that surrounding the serious
offenders are those who flirt with these impulses and trade pictures and written
accounts of sexual activity with young children.”62 While the Court
acknowledged that those who view child pornography might abuse children as
a result of such activity, the Court concluded that this potential future action,
while serious, was an insufficient ground to hold the images to be unprotected
speech.63

53

See id.
535 U.S. 234 (2002).
55
Id. at 236 (“In contrast to the speech in Ferber, speech that is itself the record of sexual abuse, the
CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production.”).
56
See generally id.
57
Id. at 240; id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(8)(B) (2000)).
58
Id. at 240 (majority opinion); id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)).
59
Id. at 264 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60
Id. at 242 (majority opinion).
61
Id. at 244–45.
62
Id. at 245.
63
Id. (“The prospect of crime, however, by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech.”)
(citing Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959)).
54
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Thus, without actual children depicted in the images, the Free Speech
Coalition successfully argued that Ferber’s justification for excluding child
pornography from the First Amendment’s protection was inapplicable in virtual
child pornography cases.64 The Court agreed, holding that the language of the
CPPA, making it unlawful to possess any images that seem to depict an actual
child engaged in sexually explicit activity, was too broad.65
Additionally, the Court held that the CPPA banned not only obscene images
of children, but also any image depicting a child—real or otherwise—engaged
in explicit activity.66 Under the Court’s test outlined in Miller v. California,67
“the Government must prove that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest, is patently offensive in light of community standards, and lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”68 The Court noted many
instances of well-received literary works that include scenes depicting sexual
activity of minors.69 Outlawing such material, the Court held, would be
inconsistent with First Amendment principles.70
C. A Grey Area in the Law: Congress’s Attempt to Overcome the Free Speech
Coalition Decision
While the Court declared the CPPA unconstitutional, it declined to comment
on the legality of morphed images.71 Morphed images, images created by
combining an image of a child with a virtual image or adult image depicting
64

See id. at 250–51.
Id. at 258. The Court pointed out that in its earlier case of New York v. Ferber, its “judgment about
child pornography was based upon how it was made, not on what it communicated.” Id. at 250–51.
66
Id. at 246.
67
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
68
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 246 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
69
Id. at 247–48 (“Both themes—teenage sexual activity and the sexual abuse of children—have inspired
countless literary works. William Shakespeare created the most famous pair of teenage lovers, one of whom is
just 13 years of age. . . . Contemporary movies pursue similar themes. Last year’s Academy Awards featured
the movie, Traffic, which was nominated for Best Picture. . . . The film also contains a scene where, although
the movie audience understands the act is not taking place, one character believes he is watching a teenage boy
performing a sexual act on an older man. Our society, like other cultures, has empathy and enduring fascination
with the lives and destinies of the young. Art and literature express the vital interest we all have in the formative
years we ourselves once knew, when wounds can be so grievous, disappointment so profound, and mistaken
choices so tragic, but when moral acts and self-fulfillment are still in reach. Whether or not the films we mention
violate the CPPA, they explore themes within the wide sweep of the statute’s prohibitions. If these films, or
hundreds of others of lesser note that explore those subjects, contain a single graphic depiction of sexual activity
within the statutory definition, the possessor of the film would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry
into the work’s redeeming value.” (citations omitted)).
70
Id. at 248.
71
Id. at 242 (finding the “[r]espondents [did] not challenge” the provision that the images fell “within
the definition of virtual child pornography” and thus the Court need not consider the issue).
65
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sexual activity,72 do not necessarily harm a child in their creation.73 Many of the
actual children in these images were never photographed for pornographic
purposes.74 They were often not posed in a sexualized manner.75 In fact, these
images are often “innocent” and can be found all over the Internet.76 While some
pedophiles use photos of children they know from their own lives, others find
images to morph on social media and other websites.77
Despite the Court’s ruling in Free Speech Coalition,78 Congress was
determined to find a workable solution to address the changing face of child
pornography. Free Speech Coalition made it clear that virtual images were
protected under the First Amendment.79 But morphed images, and the
solicitation of child pornography images in general, were still potentially outside
the protections of the First Amendment.80 Congress sought a work-around
solution that would both protect children from technological advances taking
place in the underground world of child pornography and survive a
constitutional challenge like the one that caused the demise of the CPPA.
In response to the Free Speech Coalition81 decision, Congress enacted the
PROTECT Act.82 This Act criminalizes anyone who knowingly:
advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits . . . any material
or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is
intended to cause another to believe [it is] . . . an obscene visual
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or . . . a
visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.83

The PROTECT Act’s language was clear—morphed image pornography
depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct constituted a criminal

72
73
74
75
76
77

Kirkey, supra note 9.
See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Limits of Child Pornography, 89 IND. L.J. 1437, 1477 (2014).
See Kirkey, supra note 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. The images pedophiles find sometimes originate on a parent’s social media feed or on a family

blog. Id.
78

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
Id. at 256.
80
See id. at 242.
81
Id. at 234.
82
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 34
U.S.C.).
83
18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2012).
79
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act.84 Moreover, under the Act, a state no longer needed to prove that a defendant
ever had an image depicting actual child pornography in his possession.85
Instead, the Act criminalized the solicitation of such material, regardless of
whether the material was ever in the possession of a charged defendant.86 By
enacting this legislation, Congress attempted to close the loopholes the Court’s
Free Speech Coalition decision left open.87
II. MORPHED IMAGES OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: THE PROTECT ACT IN
COURT
Unlike the guidance the Supreme Court offers on the First Amendment
implications of traditional and virtual child pornography, lower courts lack
guidance from the Court regarding the constitutionality of morphed child
pornography convictions. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of
morphed images. Additionally, while state courts, relying on outdated statutory
definitions of child pornography, have overturned convictions for possession of
morphed child pornography, federal courts generally have upheld such
convictions.88 The cases below outline how lower federal and state courts have
addressed the issue of possession and distribution of morphed child pornography
images.
A. Federal Court Cases Involving Morphed Child Pornography
The Second and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have heard cases involving
morphed child pornography.89 In each case, the courts held that the PROTECT
Act’s categorical ban on morphed child pornography is constitutional.90 In so
holding, each circuit court decision discussed the defendant’s First Amendment
free speech argument, and each circuit court concluded that the state’s interest

84

See id.
See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008) (“The statute does not require the actual
existence of child pornography. In this respect, it differs from the statutes in Ferber, Osborne, and Free Speech
Coalition, which prohibited the possession or distribution of child pornography. Rather than targeting the
underlying material, this statute bans the collateral speech that introduces such material into the childpornography distribution network.”).
86
Id. at 288.
87
See id. at 289–90.
88
Compare Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 2012), and United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725
(2d Cir. 2011), with Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
89
See Boland, 698 F.3d 877; Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725; United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622 (8th Cir.
2005).
90
See Boland, 698 F.3d at 884 (citing Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 729; Bach, 400 F.3d at 632).
85
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in protecting children from harm was significant enough to overcome such a
challenge.91
In 2011, the Second Circuit became the first federal circuit court to address
the issue of morphed child pornography. In United States v. Hotaling,92 a
defendant superimposed the heads of minor females onto the bodies of adult
females, creating morphed child pornography.93 He argued that these images
were protected speech under the First Amendment.94 The defendant
“contend[ed] that the interests of actual children were not implicated because
they were not engaged in sexual activity during the creation of the
photographs.”95 The court disagreed, finding that “the interests of actual minors
are implicated when their faces are used in creating morphed images that make
it appear that they are performing sexually explicit acts.”96
The court discussed in depth the nature of the images at issue, finding that
the defendant’s conduct clearly failed constitutional muster for protected
speech.97 The court noted that the only identifiable people in the morphed
images were the children.98 Moreover, the images contained the children’s real
first names.99 The court contrasted the facts in the instant case from the facts in
the Supreme Court’s Free Speech Coalition decision, holding that, unlike in
Free Speech Coalition where there were no identifiable images of children,
minors implicated in the instant case “were at risk of reputational harm and
suffered the psychological harm of knowing that their images were exploited
and prepared for distribution by a trusted adult.”100
The court was unpersuaded by the defendant’s argument that, because the
images had not been shared with any third parties, no harm was done to the
children.101 The images were stored in folders on his computer and “could [have]
be[en] used to create a website.”102 Thus, from the court’s vantage point, it
appeared that the defendant intended to share the images, as many of them had
91

Id.
634 F.3d 725.
93
Id. at 727.
94
Id. at 729.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 729–30.
97
Id. at 730.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 727 (describing how the defendant indexed, labeled, and encoded the photos into files in HTML,
a format commonly used to post items on the Internet).
92
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URLs and were encoded in HTML103: “[T]he HTML images were titled ‘[Jane
Doe] Upstate NY’s Hottest Teen’ and bore the actual first name of the minor
depicted” in the image.104
The court concluded that the defendant’s possession of these morphed
images lawfully subjected him to prosecution under the federal PROTECT
Act.105 Even though the court seemed to make specific findings of fact relevant
to the defendant’s case, the court generalized its holding, finding that “[s]exually
explicit images that use the faces of actual minors are not protected expressive
speech under the First Amendment.”106 This decision, and others like it from
state and federal courts,107 suggests that the PROTECT Act has found support
in courts around the country.
In the Sixth Circuit, the court looked closely at the harms victims in morphed
image cases might suffer as a result of their images being used to create child
pornography.108 In Doe v. Boland,109 the court compared the harms morphed
child pornography images cause with the harms traditional forms of child
pornography cause.110 In doing so, the court noted that while morphed images
offer a different degree of injury compared to traditional forms of child
pornography, the type of injury is quite similar.111
The victims and their guardians in Boland sought to recover damages against
a convicted defendant who morphed their children’s heads onto pornographic
images.112 Boland, the defendant, morphed the images in preparation for a child
103

Id. at 730.
Id. at 727.
105
Id. at 730.
106
Id.
107
See Shoemaker v. Taylor, 730 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Morphed images are different from
traditional child pornography because the children depicted may not have been sexually abused or physically
harmed during the images’ production. But, morphed images are like traditional child pornography in that they
are records of the harmful sexual exploitation of children. The children, who are identifiable in the images, are
violated by being falsely portrayed as engaging in sexual activity. As with traditional child pornography, the
children are sexually exploited and psychologically harmed by the existence of the images, and subject to
additional reputational harm as the images are circulated.”); McFadden v. State, 67 So. 3d 169, 184 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2010) (“Both Ferber and Ashcroft emphasized that children are harmed not only through the actual
production of pornography, but also by the knowledge of its continued circulation. We further note that the
United States Supreme Court upheld a statute criminalizing the mere possession of child pornography.”).
108
Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 880–81 (6th Cir. 2012).
109
698 F.3d 877.
110
See id. at 880–81.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 880. The defendant was charged with the criminal offense of child pornography and entered into
a pre-trial diversion agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Id. While Boland raised his challenges in the
later restitution phase of the proceeding, the First Amendment issues are identical to those that defendants often
104
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pornography trial in which he was expected to be called as an expert.113 His goal
was to show the jury that it is impossible to differentiate real child pornography
from fake imagery.114 In preparing for trial, the court explained, “Boland created
lasting images of Doe and Roe, two identifiable children, purporting to engage
in sexually explicit activity.”115
If the point of Boland’s exercise was to demonstrate that the naked eye
cannot distinguish morphed images of child pornography from real
child pornography, as he claims it was, that goes a long way toward
confirming that morphed images may create many of the same
reputational, emotional and privacy injuries as actual pornography.116

The court specifically explored whether morphed images, like the ones
Boland created, fell under the same exception to the First Amendment as actual
child pornography.117 The court highlighted that “[t]he relevant statute defines
‘child pornography’ to include morphed images, as it covers a ‘visual depiction
[that] has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor
is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.’”118 Boland argued that the PROTECT
Act was overbroad.119 Specifically, Boland argued that unless the victims
learned of the images (while being minors) and suffered psychological harm
from knowing of the images’ existence, his conduct should be protected under
the First Amendment.120 The court disagreed, holding that simply creating the
morphed image was enough to cause harm to the victims, regardless of whether
the victims ever actually saw the images.121 Once an image is shared, it becomes
“‘primed for entry into the distribution chain’ of underground child
pornographers.”122
raise at earlier stages of the criminal prosecution process. See id.
113
Id. at 879.
114
Id. at 880.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 880–81.
117
Id. at 883 (noting a free speech challenge to actual child pornography can be easily rejected and asking,
“what of morphed images like the ones Boland created?”).
118
Id.
119
See id. at 884.
120
Id.
121
Id. (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990)). Similarly, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of
the Sixth Circuit recently held that Boland could not discharge his debt to his victims because had an intent to
injure the children depicted in the morphed child pornography he created. In re Boland, No 17-8019, 2019 WL
580720 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Feb. 13, 2019). One cannot discharge damage awards for willful or malicious injuries
in bankruptcy, so the question in the case was whether the creation of these images met the requisite scienter.
Id. at *5. The court looked to the injury to the children and concluded that Boland’s intent to invade their “legally
protected interests in their reputation, emotional well-being and right to privacy” established that Boland’s
conduct was willful. Id. at *12–14.
122
Boland, 698 F.3d at 884 (citing United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 2011)).
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B. State Court Cases Involving Morphed Child Pornography
While only three federal circuit courts have analyzed the application of the
PROTECT Act to morphed child pornography images, many state courts have
analyzed the application of their own state child pornography statutes to
morphed child pornography images.123 Some of these cases conclude in a
manner consistent with the federal circuits mentioned above.124 However, in
some states, courts have held that morphed images do not constitute child
pornography.125 These states did not base their decisions on a harm analysis.126
Instead, the courts overruled morphed child pornography convictions for other
reasons, notably sometimes due to the state statute at issue being written more
narrowly than the federal PROTECT Act.127
For example, in Florida, the child pornography statute reads, in relevant part:
“It is unlawful for any person to knowingly possess . . . a photograph, motion
picture, exhibition, show, representation . . . or other presentation which, in
whole or in part, he or she knows to include any sexual conduct by a child.”128
It then proceeds to state that “[t]he possession . . . of each such photograph,
motion picture, exhibition, show, image, data, computer depiction,
representation, or presentation is a separate offense.”129 Since morphed images
do not depict a child engaged in sexual conduct, Florida courts have overturned
convictions when the child pornography at issue was in fact a morphed image.130
While the courts seem to understand the concerns the state legislatures raise, one
Florida court made its position especially clear, directly telling the legislature
what is needed in order for morphed child pornography to be an offense under
state law:
Congress enacted child pornography legislation three times, in 1994,
1996, and 2003; each time it broadened the definition of child
pornography. Section 827.071(5) requires that actual children engage
in sexual conduct. As the federal experience reflects, if our legislature
123
See, e.g., McFadden v. State, 67 So. 3d 169, 183 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (holding that collages
depicting adult nudity alongside pictures of children constituted child pornography); Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d
451, 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that Florida’s child pornography statute does not criminalize
morphed child pornography because the sexual conduct depicted must be of children).
124
See, e.g., McFadden, 67 So. 3d at 182–83 (holding that morphed images implicate the same concerns
as actual pornographic images of children).
125
See, e.g., Parker, 81 So. 3d at 452–53 (holding that although the defendant’s conduct was “loathsome,”
morphed images do not fall within the statute’s grasp and are protected speech).
126
See, e.g., id. at 457 (“[W]e confine our analysis to the statutory language.”).
127
See, e.g., id. at 453.
128
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.071(5)(a) (West 2016).
129
Id.
130
See, e.g., Parker, 81 So. 3d at 453.
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wants to follow Congress’s example and prohibit the possession of the
types of photographs involved here, we are confident that it can, and
perhaps should, craft an appropriate statute.131

The Florida Legislature has been unable to pass a state law protecting
victims of morphed child pornography. House Bill 7017 was introduced to make
amendments to Chapter 847 “Obscenity.”132 These amendments would have
made it illegal to possess, promote, view, or transmit morphed child
pornography.133 More specifically, the amendments would have expanded the
definition of “[c]hild pornography” to include any “visual depiction” that is
“adapted . . . or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in
sexual conduct.”134 However, despite passing in the house in February 2018, the
bill died in the senate.135
In New Hampshire, the state supreme court also held that the state child
pornography statute did not cover morphed child pornography.136 The defendant
in State v. Zidel was charged with the possession of child pornography137 after
he morphed images of innocent children138 with images of naked adults.139 The
defendant lawfully possessed the innocent images of the children, as he took
them himself in his role as photographer of a camp.140 Zidel did not intend to
share the images.141 Instead, he accidentally included them on a disc presented
to the camp director at the end of the summer.142
The New Hampshire state statute, in relevant part, states that it is a felony to
“knowingly . . . buy, procure, possess, or control any visual representation of a
child engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”143 Telling the court that the images
were “only his ‘personal fantasy,’” Zidel argued that under the protections of the
First Amendment, a conviction could not stand because the images “were not

131

Id. at 457 (emphasis added).
H.R. 7017, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018); see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.001–.202.
133
H.R. 7017, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018).
134
Id.
135
CS/HB 7017: Child Exploitation, FLA. SENATE, https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2018/7017 (last
visited Mar. 26, 2019).
136
State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 265 (N.H. 2008).
137
Id. at 256.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
See id.
141
See id.
142
Id.; see also Brief for the Defendant at 3, Zidel, 940 A.2d 255 (No. 2006-0549).
143
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-A:3 (West 2018); Zidel, 940 A.2d at 256–57 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 649-A:3).
132
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real.”144 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed, holding that these
morphed, or composite, images145 did not constitute child pornography under
the state statute.146
The New Hampshire opinion differs from the Florida opinion in that New
Hampshire’s Supreme Court went further than simply holding morphed images
as outside the scope of the state statute.147 In Zidel, the court also opined that the
defendant’s possession of morphed images, in and of itself, was protected speech
under the First Amendment.148 The court noted that while previous cases
involving child pornography recognized that states have “a compelling interest
‘in safeguarding the physical and psychological health of a minor,’” the central
harm at issue in those cases was the sexual abuse itself.149
The Zidel court looked at the state legislature’s reasoning behind the
enactment of the New Hampshire statute, noting that the purpose of the statute
was to prevent harm to children resulting from “their use as subjects in sexual
performances.”150 The court considered the Supreme Court’s decision in Free
Speech Coalition, wherein the Court focused its attention on how the image was
“made, not on what it communicated.”151 In doing so, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court found that the state’s application of Osborne to the facts at issue
in Zidel was misplaced.152

144

Zidel, 940 A.2d. at 256.
For the purposes of this Article, morphed and composite images represent the same thing—images
created by combining portions of a real child’s image with portions of an adult or virtual image.
146
Zidel, 940 A.2d. at 263.
147
Compare id. at 265 (determining that the application of the state statute to the defendant’s conduct
violated the defendant’s First Amendment right to free speech), with Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451, 457 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“Although the parties urge us to consider the First Amendment ramifications of section
827.071, we confine our analysis to the statutory language.”).
148
Zidel, 940 A.2d at 265.
149
Id. at 262–63 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982)); see also Osborne v. Ohio,
495 U.S. 103, 109, 111 (1990) (extending the holding in Ferber to allow states to prohibit even the mere
possession of child pornography to protect the victims and destroy the market for such acts).
150
Zidel, 940 A.2d at 262 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-A:1 (2007)) (“The legislature finds that
there has been a proliferation of exploitation of children through their use as subjects in sexual performances.
The care of children is a sacred trust and should not be abused by those who seek to profit through a commercial
network based upon the exploitation of children. The public policy of the statute demands the protection of
children from exploitation through sexual performances . . . . In accordance with the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in New York v. Ferber, this chapter makes the dissemination of visual representations of
children under the age of 16 engaged in sexual activity illegal irrespective of whether the visual representations
are legally obscene.”); see also Parker, 81 So. 3d at 457 (finding Florida’s child pornography statute does not
allow prosecution for morphed images).
151
Zidel, 940 A.2d at 263; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250–51 (2002).
152
Zidel, 940 A.2d at 263.
145
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The state argued that morphed images like those at issue in the Zidel case
constituted unprotected speech.153 The court noted that in Osborne, the Court’s
desire to protect children seemed broader than solely protecting children from
sexual abuse.154 The court considered Osborne’s finding that “‘penaliz[ing]
those who possess and view’ child pornography will decrease its production,
‘thereby decreasing demand.’”155 The court even discussed Osborne’s finding
that many sexual predators use child pornography to convince other children to
engage in illicit and illegal acts.156 However, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
held that Zidel’s conduct was protected under the First Amendment.157
To reach its conclusion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court attempted to
differentiate the facts before it with the facts of another morphed image case,
United States v. Bach.158 In Bach, the defendant morphed an illicit image of a
known juvenile onto the body of a second nude child.159 He was prosecuted
under the PROTECT Act, requiring that the defendant “knowingly receive or
distribute” child pornography, and his conviction was upheld.160 In contrast to
Bach, the defendant in Zidel never knowingly received nor knowingly
distributed the image at issue—instead, he created the image at home for his own
personal use.161 Moreover, unlike Zidel, Bach involved the sexual exploitation
of a second nude child whose body was attached to the head of the other known
juvenile.162 Indeed, sexual abuse had occurred at some point in the production
chain.163 The court found that the facts of the Zidel case, as applied to the statute
at issue, did not warrant a conviction and overturned it accordingly.164
Returning to Boland,165 the Sixth Circuit distinguished the case from Zidel,
finding that New Hampshire’s Supreme Court decision rested on the application
of a different statute to a case involving morphed child pornography images.
153

Id. at 262.
See id. at 264.
155
Id. at 259 (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1990)).
156
Id. at 259–60 (citing Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111).
157
Id. at 265.
158
Id. (citing United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 901 (2005)).
159
Bach, 400 F.3d at 625.
160
Id. at 632 (“Although there is no contention that the nude body actually is that of [the child] or that he
was involved in the production of the image, a lasting record has been created of [the child], an identifiable
minor child, seemingly engaged in sexually explicit activity. He is thus victimized every time the picture is
displayed. Unlike the virtual child pornography or the pornography using youthful looking adults . . . this image
created an identifiable child victim of sexual exploitation.”).
161
Zidel, 940 A.2d at 264–65.
162
Id. at 265.
163
Bach, 400 F.3d at 632 (noting the photograph actually “record[ed] a crime”).
164
Zidel, 940 A.2d at 265.
165
See discussion supra Section II.A.
154
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Zidel says
nothing to the contrary. That decision invalidated a statute barring
possession of morphed images because the state child-pornography
laws aimed only to “combat the harm resulting to children from the
distribution of depictions of sexual conduct involving live
performance[s] or visual reproduction of live performances by
children.” A morphed image, the state court reasoned, does not involve
a live sexual performance. The federal child-pornography statutes, by
contrast, target “computers and computer imaging technology” that
can “invade the child’s privacy and reputational interests” by
“alter[ing] innocent pictures of children to create visual depictions of
those children engaging in sexual conduct.” The legitimate
government interest in avoiding “injury to [a] child’s reputation and
emotional well-being,” allows Congress to prohibit morphed
images.166

Taken together, these cases suggest that federal courts view the resulting
harm caused by morphed child pornography significant enough to warrant the
images’ exclusion from First Amendment protections.167
III. A THREE-PART PRESCRIPTION TO ADDRESS THE CHANGING FACE OF
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
A. The Supreme Court Should Find the PROTECT Act to Be Constitutional
with Respect to Morphed Child Pornography
Scholars opine that child pornography falls outside the purview of the First
Amendment, not because of the harm caused by an image’s circulation, but
instead because of the harm caused by the image’s creation.168 These scholars
166

Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 884 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
See also United States v. Stewart, 839 F. Supp. 2d 914, 925 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“The Sixth Circuit has
upheld the criminalization of graphic manipulation of a photograph by a defendant even where a child was not
used to create the original images and where there is no explicit evidence of harm to the photographed child.”);
United States v. Anderson, No. 4:12CR3083, 2012 WL 6967610, at *6 (D. Neb. Dec. 26, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 4:12-CR-3083, 2013 WL 396014 (D. Neb. Jan. 30, 2013), aff’d, 759 F.3d 891
(8th Cir. 2014) (“Following the reasoning in Bach, Hotaling and Boland, the undersigned magistrate judge finds
the morphed image in this case . . . is not protected under the First Amendment. Unlike the allegations in Zidel
and Gerber, [the defendant] has been charged with distributing child pornography, implicating associated and
foreseeable psychological harm to an identifiable child . . . that may not arise from mere possession of the
image.”). See generally Boland, 698 F.3d 877; United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2011); Bach,
400 F.3d 622.
168
See, e.g., Carmen M. Cusack, Busting Patriarchal Booby Traps: Why Feminists Fear Minor
Distinctions in Child Porn Cases, 39 SOUTHERN U. L. REV. 43, 59 (2011) (“The Gerber court concluded that the
altered images were analogous to virtual child pornography, not actual child pornography, since the photo of the
child’s face did not evidence the exploitation of a real child who actually engaged in or simulated the sexual
167
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argue that the child pornography exception to the First Amendment is grounded
less in the reputational harm a child’s image being shared publicly causes, than
in the actual harm creation of the pornographic image itself causes.169 This
distinction is important because in today’s digital world, some images do not
cause any harm in their creation.170 However, the circulation harm is
significant.171
There is no doubt that survivors of morphed child pornography will
experience harm differently than survivors of sexual abuse whose abuse was
recorded and/or distributed. The Initiative to Support Child Sex Abuse Survivors
illustrated this reality when it surveyed survivors who identified the significant
cause of the harm of circulation.172 Survivors of sexual abuse have unique needs.
One sexual abuse survivor detailed this point as she outlined how the trauma
remains with her:
Memories and feelings of the past still affect me today like it was
yesterday. The abuse broke up my family unit. I think about it when I
see families together. I think about it when I see moms and daughters
together that are the age of me and my mother and how our relationship
could have been different if abuse had not happened. I think about it at
school, because school is taking me so much longer to finish and how
much harder it is for me to succeed because of the court I went through
and the PTSD I suffer with everyday [sic]. I think about it when I see
children and families because I still mourn for the loss of my family
unit. I think about it when I have arguments . . . because I have such a
heightened flight or fight instinct that it gets hard to communicate my
feelings.173

An individual whose image is morphed with an illicit image and shared as
child pornography avoids much of the trauma sexual abuse survivors
experience;174 however, as the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of
conduct depicted. The sexually explicit content depicting an adult was neither child pornography nor obscenity.
The harm principle, required by the Gerber court and other courts, is the best way for the government to protect
children while avoiding the expansion of Williams and treading into anti-woman territory.”).
169
This is essentially the argument set forth by the Court in Free Speech Coalition. Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002).
170
Kirkey, supra note 9.
171
As a former Special Victims Unit prosecutor, this Author recognizes that the harm in the creation of a
pornographic image of children is distinctive from the harm caused by the circulation of an image depicting
child pornography. However, courts should find that this is a distinction without legal significance.
172
See CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CHILD PROTECTION, SURVIVORS’ SURVEY 124 (2017), https://www.
protectchildren.ca/app/en/csa_imagery#csa_imagery-survey_results (discussing the harm survivors experience
as a result of circulation such as fearing discovery would cause further distribution of their images).
173
CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CHILD PROTECTION, supra note 172, at 265.
174
See id. at 267.
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Appeals have explained, morphed child pornography implicates real children
and has the potential to cause them reputational and psychological harm.175
The Supreme Court made clear that a defendant’s First Amendment free
speech protection cannot evaporate simply because a virtual image might harm
a potential child in the future.176 In Free Speech Coalition, the state argued that
pedophiles often use child pornography (virtual or otherwise) to seduce
victims.177 Specifically, the state highlighted that a high percentage of child
pornography viewers have also admitted to sexually abusing children.178 The
Court did not find this argument persuasive.179
[The Government] argues that the CPPA is necessary because
pedophiles may use virtual child pornography to seduce children.
There are many things innocent in themselves, however, such as
cartoons, video games, and candy, that might be used for immoral
purposes, yet we would not expect those to be prohibited because they
can be misused. The Government, of course, may punish adults who
provide unsuitable materials to children, and it may enforce criminal
penalties for unlawful solicitation. The precedents establish, however,
that speech within the rights of adults to hear may not be silenced
completely in an attempt to shield children from it.180

The Court should find that this future harm to a potential child, coupled with
the circulation harm to an actual child, is significant enough to warrant morphed
child pornography’s exclusion from the protections of the First Amendment.
Without this safeguard, individuals, including law enforcement, would be
required to “turn the other cheek” when discovering real children imaged in
pornographic pictures on search warrants.181 A continued grey area would exist
in the law in instances where the images were inadvertently discovered.182 The
175

See discussion supra Section II.A.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002).
177
Id. at 251.
178
Id. at 241, 250, 253; see also Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L.
REV. 847, 854 (2008) (“Moreover, there is growing evidence linking the possession of child pornography with
acts of sexual violence against children. A recent study by psychologists at the Federal Bureau of Prisons found
that eighty-five percent of individuals charged with possessing child pornography admitted that they also
sexually abused children.”) (citing Benedict Carey & Julian Sher, Debate on Child Pornography’s Link to
Molesting, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/19/us/19sex.html?_r=2&oref=
slogin&oref=slogin).
179
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 251–52.
180
Id. (citations omitted).
181
For an example of law enforcement officers discovering such pornographic pictures on a search
warrant, see McFadden v. State, 67 So. 3d 169, 174 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
182
See State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 256 (N.H. 2008) (finding the defendant accidentally gave the
morphed images away).
176
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risk of future circulation of these morphed images is too real and too harmful to
ignore.
The significant harms caused by circulation of damaging images is not limited
to child pornography, and it is helpful to think about the harm from a broader
perspective. Cyber-harassment and the sharing of revenge pornography cause
similar reputational and psychological harms.183 In her article, Law’s Expressive
Value in Combatting Cyber Gender Harassment, Professor Citron explores
cyber-harassment through a feminist lens.184 She argues that, “[t]he online
harassment of women exemplifies twenty-first century behavior that profoundly
harms women yet too often remains overlooked and even trivialized.”185 Citron
highlights the misconceptions that often lead to society marginalizing the
conduct of those who engage in cyber-harassment.186 At the root of these
misconceptions is the mistaken belief that the harm caused to victims of cyberharassment are not significant enough to warrant its condemnation through
legislation.187 However, as Citron points out, the harm caused to victims of
cyber-harassment is very real and often targets women, a traditionally vulnerable
group in society.188 This harm can take a “significant economic, emotional, and
physical” toll on its victims.189
The threat of morphed images coming to light in the future is significantly
worrisome. The need to exclude morphed child pornography from First
Amendment protection can be illustrated by its similarities to cyber-harassment,
which by some state definitions, includes revenge porn.190 Just as revenge porn
harms victims through circulation, morphed child pornography also harms
children through its circulation.191 Victims of both crimes experience “a privacy
or reputational harm akin to the harms of defamation, invasion of privacy, or

183
See Danielle Keats Citron, Essay, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment,
108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2009) (discussing the harms caused by revenge pornography and cyberharassment).
184
See generally id. (discussing the gendered nature of online harassment and its effect on women).
185
Id. at 373.
186
Id. at 395 (“Commentators trivialize the harassment of women online by arguing that: (1) it constitutes
innocuous teasing, (2) women can address the harassment on their own, and (3) cyber-harassment coheres with
the internet’s unique norms.”).
187
Id.
188
Id. at 396–97.
189
Id.
190
E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.049 (West 2017) (“‘Sexually cyberharass’ means to publish a sexually
explicit image of a person that contains or conveys the personal identification information of the depicted person
to an Internet website without the depicted person’s consent, for no legitimate purpose, with the intent of causing
substantial emotional distress to the depicted person.”).
191
See Citron, supra note 183, at 396–97.
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false light invasion of privacy.”192 Like revenge porn, a morphed image of a
child in and of itself might not physically harm the individual pictured at its
creation, but the harm of it being viewed or circulated is prevalent and
worrisome.193 However, unlike most adult revenge porn cases, where the adult
might have consented to the image’s existence at its creation, young children are
unable to give consent to any image taken—innocent or otherwise. A defendant
(related or otherwise) should not be able to possess a child’s image if he has ill
intent with regard to how that image will be treated.194
Online privacy violations are not only harmful, but they are prevalent as
well. Four percent of Internet users in the United States “have had intimate
images posted online without their consent or” threatened to be shared without
their consent.195 For young women, the statistic is even more startling. A law
review article authored by legal practitioners Carrie Goldberg and Adam Massey
found that one in ten women under the age of thirty have had a sexualized image
192
Hessick, supra note 73, at 1478 (“The conceptual foundation of this harm relies on the distribution of
an image to other individuals, just as reputation and privacy torts require publication.”).
193
Id. at 1478–81.
194
See Layla Goldnick, Note, Coddling the Internet: How the CDA Exacerbates the Proliferation of
Revenge Porn and Prevents a Meaningful Remedy for Its Victims, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 583 (2015). As
seen in child pornography cases, courts must balance the harm caused by revenge porn with the defendant’s right
to free speech. Id. at 595. In response to First Amendment concerns, states criminalizing revenge porn often
require proof of more than simply sharing an intimate image of an adult without the adult’s consent to share such
image. Id. at 616. The focus on these statutes centers on the intent of the defendant, perhaps even more so than
in his actions in sharing the harmful material. See id. Some statutes require a showing that the defendant shared
the image with the intent to harass the victim. See id. Other state statutes require a showing that the image was
taken with the expectation that it would remain private. See id. Some states require a showing that either the
victim suffered a financial loss as a result of the nonconsensual sharing or that the defendant shared it seeking a
financial gain. Id. at 617. Taken as a whole, revenge porn statutes include requirements that focus on how the
charged defendant used the image to take advantage of a victim or to take advantage of an opportunity to use
another’s image for personal gain. Id. at 615–17. Any time a defendant possesses a child’s image and transforms
it into morphed child pornography, he takes advantage of the child’s image—an image that he has no lawful
right to possess or manipulate. This “taking advantage” parallels the statutes criminalizing revenge porn. Layla
Goldnick lists the following states as having this (or a similar) requirement:

Alaska (ALASKA REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.61.120(a) (2014)); California (CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2013)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107(1)(a)(I) (West
2014)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90(a)(1) (West 2014)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 711-1110.9(1)(b) (West 2014)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-809(c)
(West 2014)); New York (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45(5) (McKinney 2014)); Pennsylvania (PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3131(a) (West 2014)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203(2) (West
2014)); and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.2(A) (West 2014)).
Id. at 616 n.233.
195
Carrie Goldberg & Adam Massey, State-Sanctioned Humiliation: Why New York Needs a
Nonconsensual Pornography Law, MAY 2017 NYSBA J. 48, 49–50 (2017) (citing AMANDA LENHART ET AL.,
NONCONSENSUAL IMAGE SHARING: ONE IN 25 AMERICANS HAS BEEN A VICTIM OF ‘REVENGE PORN’ 3, 4–5
(2016), https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/Nonconsensual_Image_Sharing_2016.pdf).
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either threatened to be posted or actually posted online.196 This privacy harm has
caused many state legislatures to criminalize the nonconsensual sharing of
intimate images.197
Like criminalizing cyber-harassment and revenge porn, criminalizing
morphed child pornography does not curtail a defendant’s right to free speech.
As Professor Citron notes, “[s]elf-expression should receive little protection if
its sole purpose is to extinguish the self-expression of another.”198 In many ways
this mirrors the harms victims of morphed child pornography might face: cyberharassment and revenge porn take away a victim’s right to fully define herself
online.199 Indeed, “[y]ou are what Google says you are.”200 For a child, this harm
is especially worrisome. If a child is depicted as a victim of child pornography
or a willing participant in a sexual encounter, she might face reputational and
psychological harm, including stigmatization and shame for years into the
future.
B. State Legislatures Should Amend Their Child Pornography Statutes to
Encompass Morphed Child Pornography
Many state statutes do not criminalize the possession of morphed child
pornography. Florida law defines child pornography as “any image depicting a
minor engaged in sexual conduct.”201 Similarly, in New Hampshire, child
pornography images are called “child sexual abuse images” and are defined as
“any visual representation of a child engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”202

196

Id. at 50. The authors represent victims of revenge porn. See id. at 49.
See id. at 50 (“While these statutes differ substantially from state to state, all of them ban the intentional
distribution of nude images and video when that distribution is without the consent of the party depicted. Taken
as whole, these states and the proposed federal law are important steps in legislating a right to sexual privacy.
And it makes sense: our health records (HIPAA) and our educational records (FERPA) are private under federal
law; why shouldn’t material that’s more personal warrant protections?”). Additionally, in many states, victims
of revenge porn can recover damages under tort law against individuals who nonconsensually share their image.
See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Revenge Porn, State Law, and Free Speech, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 57, 84 (2014) (noting
that a damages remedy for “offensive publication of private details of an individual’s life” is provided by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is adopted by most jurisdictions and often cited by judges). While there
are certainly similar causes of actions available under tort law for victims of morphed child pornography, an
examination of those actions is outside the scope of this Article. Therefore, this section is limited to criminal
liability for revenge porn.
198
Citron, supra note 183, at 406.
199
See id. at 397–98.
200
See generally Megan Angelo, You Are What Google Says You Are, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2009, 11:43 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2009/02/you-are-what-go/ (outlining how the Google search results for an individual
define her professional identity).
201
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.001 (West 2017).
202
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-A:3 (West 2018).
197
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Under Mississippi law, child pornography is defined as “an actual child
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”203 These are just three examples of state
statutes that do not include language in their child pornography definitions that
would permit a conviction to stand based on the possession of morphed child
pornography.204
To protect children in their respective states, states should update their child
pornography statutes to include a broader definition of child pornography. States
could model their revised child pornography statutes after the PROTECT Act,
as it criminalizes the possession of morphed child pornography and has
withstood First Amendment scrutiny in federal courts.205 One Florida appellate
court indicated that a revision to the state statute is needed to even begin to
discuss the First Amendment issues raised (and often overcome) in federal
morphed child pornography cases:
As this overview demonstrates, Congress enacted child pornography
legislation three times, in 1994, 1996, and 2003; each time it
broadened the definition of child pornography. Section 827.071(5)
requires that actual children engage in sexual conduct. As the federal
experience reflects, if our legislature wants to follow Congress’s
example and prohibit the possession of the types of photographs
involved here, we are confident that it can, and perhaps should, craft
an appropriate statute.
Although the parties urge us to consider the First Amendment
ramifications of Section 827.071, we confine our analysis to the
statutory language. Because our construction of it concludes that it
does not apply to [the defendant’s] conduct, we have no occasion to
decide whether its application to him is unconstitutional. Such an
analysis is unnecessary for our decision.206

A model statute might mirror the PROTECT Act’s relevant language, finding
guilty:
(a) Any person who— . . .
(3) knowingly—
(A) reproduces any child pornography for distribution through the
mails, or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce

203

MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-5-33 (West Supp. 2018).
Other state child pornography laws that do not allow for the prosecution of morphed images include
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3553 (2018) and KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.335 (West 2016).
205
See discussion supra Section II.A.
206
Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
204
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or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer; or
(B) advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the
mails, or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce
or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer, any material or purported material in a manner
that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe,
that the material or purported material is, or contains—
(i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; or
(ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.207

Under such a statute, the state would not be required to prove that a child is
engaged in a sexual act in a pornographic image of a child. Instead, the statute
would require the state to prove that the image “reflects the belief, or that is
intended to cause another to believe, that the material or purported material is,
or contains” obscene images depicting an actual child engaged in sexually
explicit conduct or a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.208 State statutes such as this broadly construe child
pornography to include “innocent” images of actual children that are morphed
with adult or virtual sexualized images. This language excludes both virtual
child pornography and non-obscene images that depict minors engaged in
sexually explicit acts (such as the movies and films discussed in Part I).209 This
would mirror the PROTECT Act in many ways. State courts should hold that
the circulation harm (or potential for circulation harm) caused to the actual
children morphed into the child pornography images is significant. When
coupled with the potential harm that may be caused to additional children
because of a pedophile viewing such images or showing such images to
prospective sexual abuse victims, these images warrant morphed child
pornography’s exclusion from First Amendment protections.
C. Law Enforcement Should Oversee a Public Health Campaign Aimed at
Educating Parents of the Risks Posed by Sharing a Child’s Image Online
Parents must be made aware that pedophiles take an interest in creating
morphed images. These individuals may lurk within a parent’s newsfeed and
might download a child’s image without the permission or knowledge of the
207

18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2012) (emphasis added).
Id.
209
See discussion supra Part I; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256–58 (2002)
(discussing what the language of the CPPA prohibits).
208
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parent.210 Such an image can become child pornography if it is morphed with a
computerized image or with an image of an adult.211 Unlike more traditional
forms of child pornography, the child depicted in the morphed image was not
harmed in the creation of the image.212 But most, if not all parents, would find
such an image to be harmful to the child. Just as if traditional child
pornography213 is shared online, when morphed child pornography is shared, the
child’s digital identity is forever tarnished. With today’s facial recognition
software, the possibilities for this image to show up over the course of the child’s
lifetime are endless.214 Writing for the National Post, one of Canada’s leading
news publications, Sharon Kirkey discussed this phenomenon: “Pedophiles are
re-posting innocuous photos of children lifted from their parents’ Facebook
accounts, a perverse phenomenon highlighting the darker side of ‘sharenting,’
those hunting online predators warn.”215
According to the head of Canada’s online child photography tip line, images
are often reshared on pedophile websites, where photos of children doing
“normal” things are categorized and shared amongst pedophiles.216 Safety
officials in Australia are also concerned.217 One official, eSafety Commissioner
Toby Dadd, told an Australian journalist that one of the pedophile image-sharing
sites he visited had over forty-five million images.218 He found that “‘about half
the material appeared to be sourced directly from social media’ and clearly
labeled in folders as images from Facebook, or other social sites like Kik, with
one folder called ‘Kik girls’. Another was labelled ‘My daughter’s Instagram
friends.’”219
Indeed, legislatures, police officers, attorneys, and courts are not the only
ones who need to be familiarized with the dangers of morphed child
210

Kirkey, supra note 9.
Id. (quoting the director of a Canadian tip line website for child pornography who says pedophiles
morph photos when they like the way a child looks).
212
See Hessick, supra note 73 (“While the morphed image makes it appear as though the child is being
sexually exploited or abused, the child never actually suffers such abuse. Put simply, morphed computer images
involve no sexual exploitation or abuse of children in the production process, and thus they do not fall within
the proposed definition of child pornography.” (citation omitted)).
213
By traditional child pornography, this means child pornography that depicts an actual child being
sexually abused.
214
See Ben Woods, Facial Recognition Can Identify You Even if Your Face Is Blurred, WIRED (Aug. 8,
2016),
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/facial-recognition-systems-can-identify-you-even-if-your-face-isblurred.
215
Kirkey, supra note 9.
216
Id.
217
See Battersby, supra note 13.
218
Id.
219
Id.
211
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pornography. Parents must become apprised about the dangers as well. It is not
only the downloading and sharing of images from social media that parents need
to be concerned with: “In some cases, the images grabbed from Facebook,
Instagram and other social media accounts are being manipulated and photoshopped, so that the head of the child is pasted onto another child’s naked
body.”220 One study reported that 92% of two-year-olds have an online
presence.221 Another study, conducted by the Pew Research Center, found that
75% of parents turn to social media for parenting advice and support.222 Few of
these parents are concerned when others share information about their
children.223
While parents are concerned with what their teens are doing online that could
harm them now or in the future, this Pew report shows that few parents are
concerned with their own online actions with respect to their children.224 As this
Article explains, parents can inadvertently expose their children to danger
online. By becoming aware of this potential risk, parents can make wellinformed choices regarding their online sharing. While this will not ameliorate
the risk of morphed child pornography, it will encourage families and society to
take a hard look at the changing face of child pornography.
CONCLUSION
The Internet has changed how child pornography is created and shared.225
While in the past only children who were sexually abused were depicted in
pornographic images, today’s technology makes it possible for a child to be
depicted in pornographic images without ever once engaging in a sexual or
obscene act. To protect children, the U.S. Supreme Court should uphold the
PROTECT Act’s ban on morphed child pornography. Moreover, state
220
Kirkey, supra note 9 (“‘(A pedophile) might like the way a particular child looks, so they take that
face and morph it onto another shot they’ve come across online of a child sexual abuse image,’ said Signy
Arnason, director of Winnipeg-based Cypertip.ca, [sic] operated by the Canadian Centre for Child Protection.”).
221
Larry Magid, Study: 92% of U.S. 2-Year-Olds Have Online Record, CNET (Oct. 6, 2010, 4:05 PM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/study-92-of-u-s-2-year-olds-have-online-record/.
222
Maeve Duggan et al., Parents and Social Media, PEW RES. CTR. (July 16, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/07/16/parents-and-social-media/#fn-13802-1.
223
Id. (“Few parents say they have felt uncomfortable when information about their children is shared by
other family members or caregivers on social media. Most parents have not felt uneasy about the content posted
about their children by other family members or caregivers on social media. 12% of all parents of children under
18 say they have ever felt uncomfortable about something posted about their child on social media by a spouse,
family member or friend. Fully 88% say they have not felt this way. 11% of all parents have ever asked for
content about their child posted by a family member, caregiver or friend to be removed from social media.”).
224
See generally id.
225
See Kirkey, supra note 9.
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legislatures should amend their child pornography statutes, potentially by
following the PROTECT Act as outlined in this Article. Lastly, law enforcement
in the United States should commence a public health campaign addressing the
realities of morphed child pornography, encouraging parents to make wellinformed decisions before sharing pictures of their children online. These cogent
paths forward can offer meaningful legal and social benefits to victims and
potential victims of child sexual abuse and pornography while protecting the
First Amendment rights of the accused.

